

# Anti Hunter Staking & Locking Whitepaper (Draft v0.2.1)

Receipts-funded staking for \$ANTIHUNTER: 30/60/90/120-day locks, linear streaming, explicit reward sources, and deterministic control rules.

## TL;DR

- **Lock terms:** 30 / 60 / 90 / 120 days (bonus weight for longer locks)
- **Rewards:** streamed **linearly** (per-deposit schedule)
- **Early exit:** allowed with **25% principal penalty**
- **Penalty routing:** **100% to rewards pool** (paper hands subsidize diamond hands)
- **Fee routing:** **33% to rewards pool / 67% to treasury**
- **No fake APY:** rewards are **not promised**; yields are receipts-funded and can go to **0**
- **Dynamic buyback:** deterministic rule tied to **moving average of net inflows** (no discretion)

## 0) SCOPE & PRINCIPLES

This document specifies staking/locking mechanics and the control rules that govern rewards and buyback behavior. The design goal is boring, auditable tokenomics: **if you can't point to a dashboard + a transaction + a diff, it didn't happen.**

## 1) MOTIVATION

\$ANTIHUNTER is a receipts-first, on-chain venture desk token. Tokenomics should be driven by **real inflows** and **verifiable on-chain receipts**—not narrative APY. This staking design aims to: (a) reward commitment, (b) reduce reflexive dumping, and (c) keep the mechanism simple enough to audit.

## 2) SYSTEM OVERVIEW

The staking system is a single on-chain vault coordinating three flows:

- **Stakers deposit** \$ANTIHUNTER and choose a lock term: 30 / 60 / 90 / 120 days.
- **Rewards stream** from a funded Rewards Pool over time (linear).
- **Early exits pay a 25% penalty** on withdrawn principal; penalties are routed into the Rewards Pool for remaining stakers.

## 3) LOCK TERMS & BONUS WEIGHTS

Stakers choose a lock term. Longer terms receive a higher **staking weight** (a bonus share of any rewards that are distributed). This is a simple way to reward longer commitment without promising yield.

## Lock terms (v0.2.1)

- **30 days** — weight 1.0x
- **60 days** — weight 1.4x
- **90 days** — weight 1.9x
- **120 days** — weight 2.5x

Weights are parameters (auditable on-chain) and may be revised in future drafts; any change must be disclosed and timelocked.

## Other core parameters

- **Reward duration:** linear streaming (per-deposit schedule)
- **Early unstake penalty:** 25% (2500 bps) on principal withdrawn before maturity
- **Penalty destination:** Rewards Pool (100%)
- **Reward token:** \$ANTIHUNTER (initial)

## 4) REWARD SOURCE HIERARCHY (AND NO FAKE APY)

**Rewards are not promised.** There is no fixed or target APY. Rewards are funded in this order:

1. **Fees paid in \$ANTIHUNTER** (primary): protocol fees settle directly in \$ANTIHUNTER and are routed **33% to the Rewards Pool and 67% to the Treasury**.
2. **Early-exit penalties** paid by exiting stakers (routed 100% to the Rewards Pool).
3. **Optional emissions** only if explicitly enabled and within a hard cap (bootstrapping, not permanent).

**Separately:** realized P&L (e.g. WETH settled to treasury) is used for **on-market buybacks of \$ANTIHUNTER** under the deterministic rule in Section 7.

Any yield shown in UI/docs must be labeled as either: (a) **realized historical** yield over a stated window, or (b) a **mechanical estimate derived from on-chain inflows**. It must never be presented as guaranteed.

## 5) LOCKING MECHANICS (AVOID SYNCHRONIZED CLIFFS)

To avoid a single "epoch unlock day," v0.2 uses a **per-deposit rolling schedule** tied to the selected term:

- Each deposit has its own maturity timestamp (now + 30/60/90/120 days).
- Rewards stream linearly over time and do not require synchronized epoch resets.

## 6) CONTINUATION / ROLLOVER (RE-LOCK INCENTIVE)

To reduce mass "end-of-epoch" sell pressure, the protocol supports an opt-in **relock / rollover** at maturity (same or longer term).

### Rollover incentive (A + cap)

- If a user re-locks within a short window after maturity (e.g. 24h), they receive a **temporary bonus weight** on the next lock only.
- **Bonus:**  $+0.2 \times$  weight applied to the selected term weight for the next lock.
- **Cap:** total effective weight is capped at  $3.0 \times$  (prevents runaway incentives).
- Bonus applies only when rolling to the **same or longer** term, and does not stack across multiple actions within a single term.

This incentive changes distribution share; it does not create promised yield. Rewards remain receipts-funded and may be 0.

## 7) PROGRAMMATIC BUYBACK (FEES IN \$ANTIHUNTER + PNL BUYS)

Buybacks should be **non-discretionary**. In this design, **fees are paid in \$ANTIHUNTER** (used for staking rewards and treasury funding), while **realized P&L** (settled in a settlement asset like WETH) is used to **buy \$ANTIHUNTER on-market**.

### Inputs (daily)

- **Fee inflow:**  $\text{fee\_AH\_t} = \$\text{ANTIHUNTER}$  fees received on day  $t$ .
- **Realized PnL:**  $\text{pnl\_WETH\_t} = \text{WETH}$  (or WETH-equivalent) realized PnL settled to treasury on day  $t$ .

### Buyback controller (deterministic)

- Signal: compute  $\text{MA\_t} = N$ -day moving average of  $\text{pnl\_WETH}$  (and optionally fee value converted to WETH via an on-chain price oracle / TWAP).
- Set  $\text{buyback\_bps\_target} = \text{clamp}(\text{BPS\_MIN}, \text{BPS\_MAX}, \text{BPS\_MAX} * \text{MA\_t} / (\text{MA\_t} + \text{K}))$ .
- Rate-limit:  $\text{buyback\_bps}$  can change by at most  $\Delta$  bps per day.
- Daily spend (WETH):  $\text{Budget\_t} = \min((\text{buyback\_bps}/10,000) * \text{pnl\_WETH\_t}, \text{Free\_t}, \text{BUDGET\_MAX\_PER\_DAY})$ .
- Execution: swap  $\text{Budget\_t}$  WETH for  $\$ANTIHUNTER$  on a whitelisted DEX path, enforce max slippage, emit events.

**Important:** this algorithm controls *how much* realized PnL gets converted into  $\$ANTIHUNTER$  on-market. It does not guarantee buybacks (if  $\text{pnl\_WETH\_t}$  is 0, buyback spend is 0).

## 8) EMISSIONS CAP, RUNWAY, AND INFLOWS = 0

If emissions are enabled, they must be bounded by a hard cap (e.g.,  $\text{EMISSIONS\_MAX\_PER\_DAY}$  and/or  $\text{EMISSIONS\_MAX\_TOTAL}$ ). The protocol should publish “reward runway” under (i) current inflows and (ii) a conservative stress case where inflows drop to zero.

In the inflows = 0 case, rewards can only be paid from existing reserves and any remaining emissions budget; if those are exhausted, rewards necessarily decline and may pause. This is an explicit design

constraint, not a hidden assumption.

## 9) EARLY EXIT PENALTY ACCOUNTING

- **Penalty base:** principal only (not on accrued rewards).
- **Routing:** penalty is transferred to Rewards Pool on-chain.
- **Disclosure:** UI must show "effective cost of exit" at the time of withdrawal.

## 10) ON-CHAIN RECEIPTS & VERIFICATION

Auditability is part of the spec. At minimum, the protocol should expose:

- Canonical contract addresses and treasury addresses.
- Events for: fees received, rewards streamed, penalties collected, buybacks executed.
- Public verification links (e.g., explorer + dashboard) that reconcile to those events.

## 11) RISKS

- **Low inflows → low rewards:** rewards may be small or zero.
- **Strategy risk:** realized PnL can be negative.
- **Smart contract risk:** bugs, exploits, upgrades.
- **Liquidity/market risk:** slippage, volatility, LP dynamics.
- **Penalty severity:** early exit is expensive by design.

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Draft v0.2.1 — for discussion. This is not financial advice.